Inconsistency in natural languages

Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184 (2013)
An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber
Keywords Trivialism  Inconsistency  Regimentation  Curry’s paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0136-5
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Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction. Oxford University Press Uk.

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