Ontology and the word 'exist': Uneasy relations
Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):74-101 (2010)
| Abstract | An extensive exploration of the special properties of ‘exist’ is here undertaken. Two of several results are: Denying that `exist’ has associated with it a set of necessary and sufficient conditions has seemed to a number of philosophers to imply metaphysical nihilism . This is because it has seemed that without such conditions the target domain of `existence’ is arbitrarily open. I show this is wrong. Second, my analysis sheds light on the puzzling question of what we are asking when we ask of something, `Does it exist?’ and mean that question in an ontically relevant way | |||||||||
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