Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):45-61 (2011)
|Abstract||Tim Crane (2011) characterizes the cognitive role of singular thought via singular mental files: the application of such files to more than one object is senseless. As many do, he thus stresses the contrast between ‘singular’ and ‘general’. I give a counterexample, plurally-directed singular thought, and I offer alternative characterizations of singular thought—better described as ‘objects-directed thought’—initially in terms of the defeasibility of the descriptions associated with one's thinking of an object, and then more broadly in terms of whether descriptions of the object or description-independent epistemic routes to the object are primarily operative in an agent's thinking|
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