David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
So far we have considered what it means for something to be conscious. In this section we place these considerations in a larger framework, exploring the uses of consciousness. Thus we move away from a consideration of separate conscious events îï to a concern with conscious îaccessï, îproblem-solvingï and îcontrolï. Chapter 6 describes the commonly observed "triad" of conscious problem assignment, unconscious computation of routine problems, and conscious display of solutions and subgoals. This triadic pattern is observable in many psychological tasks, including creative processes, mental arithmetic, language comprehension, recall, and voluntary control. It suggests that conscious contents often serve to assign problems to unconscious processors which work out routine details, constrained by a goal context. The interplay between conscious contents and goal contexts also provides a plausible account of the stream of consciousness. In Chapter 7, a contrastive analysis of voluntary versus involuntary actions leads to a modern version of James' ideomotor theory, suggesting that voluntary actions are also recruited by conscious goal images. This view fits smoothly into our developing theory.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bernhard Hommel (2007). Consciousness and Control: Not Identical Twins. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):155-176.
Max Velmans (2004). Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Michael Schmitz (2011). Limits of the Conscious Control of Action. Social Psychology 42 (1):93-98.
Bernard J. Baars (1987). What is Conscious in the Control of Action? A Modern Ideomotor Theory of Voluntary Action. In D. Gorfein & Robert R. Hoffman (eds.), Learning and Memory: The Ebbinghaus Centennial Symposium. Lawrence Erlbaum.
Gezinus Wolters & R. Hans Phaf (2002). Contrasts and Dissociations Suggest Qualitative Differences Between Conscious and Unconscious Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):359-360.
Storrs McCall (2013). Does the Brain Lead the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):262-265.
Max Velmans (2002). How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):3-29.
Bernard J. Baars (1998). Attention, Self, and Conscious Self-Monitoring. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads7 ( #188,281 of 1,102,881 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #297,281 of 1,102,881 )
How can I increase my downloads?