Why it must be consciousness - for real!
| Abstract | 1.1 Bilateral damage to the thalamus abolishes waking consciousness. The critical site of this damage is believed to be a relatively small cluster of neurons, about the size of a pencil eraser on either side of the brain's midline, called the Intra-Laminar Nuclei (ILN) because they are located inside the white layers (laminae) that divide the two thalami into their major groupings of nuclei. The fact that bilateral damage to the ILNs abolishes consciousness is very unusual. There is no other site in the brain that has this property, except the reticular formation in the brain stem. In contrast, huge chunks of cortex can be damaged without abolishing the STATE of consciousness. (Cortical damage does change the CONTENTS of consciousness, of course). | |||||||||
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Susan J. Blackmore (2005). Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
S. Majerus, H. Gill-Thwaites, Kristin Andrews & Steven Laureys (2006). Behavioral Evaluation of Consciousness in Severe Brain Damage. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu (2009). Brain-Damaged Patients and the Moral Significance of Consciousness. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (1):6-26.
Josh McDermott (1995). Global Workspace Theory: Consciousness Explained? Harvard Brain 2 (1).
Peter Carruthers & Vincent Picciuto (2011). Should Damage to the Machinery for Social Perception Damage Perception. Cognitive Neuroscience 2 (2):116-17.
Yves Rossetti (2001). Implicit Perception in Action: Short-Lived Motor Representation of Space. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.
Géry D'Ydewalle (2000). The Case Against a Single Consciousness Center: Much Ado About Nothing? European Psychologist 5 (1):12-13.
Anton M. L. Coenen (2007). Consciousness Without a Cortex, but What Kind of Consciousness is This? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):87-88.
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