A defence of liberal ironism

Res Publica 11 (4):403-423 (2005)
Richard Rorty’s notion of ironism has been widely criticized for entailing frivolity and light-mindedness, for being inimical to moral commitment and, perhaps most importantly, for its putative incompatibility with his vision of liberalism. This paper suggests that these criticisms are misplaced, stemming from a misunderstanding of ironism that Rorty’s presentation has itself in part encouraged. The paper goes on to argue that ironism is not only consistent with the liberal society which Rorty favours, but that it can serve such a society by helping to illustrate the ways in which those societies contain unrecognized injustices
Keywords anti-foundationalism  cruelty  ironism  liberalism  re-description  Rorty  the self
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DOI 10.1007/s11158-005-5761-0
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