A paradox for supertask decision makers

Philosophical Studies 153 (2):307 (2011)
Abstract
I consider two puzzles in which an agent undergoes a sequence of decision problems. In both cases it is possible to respond rationally to any given problem yet it is impossible to respond rationally to every problem in the sequence, even though the choices are independent. In particular, although it might be a requirement of rationality that one must respond in a certain way at each point in the sequence, it seems it cannot be a requirement to respond as such at every point for that would be to require the impossible.
Keywords Supertask  Infinite decision puzzle  Rationality  Deontic Barcan formula
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