|Abstract||Taking a Russellian approach to descriptions, this paper aims to explain the nature of referring, the rationale for using definite descriptions referentially, the difference between referring to something and merely alluding to it or just describing it, specific uses of indefinite descriptions, and the pragmatic character of the referential-attributive distinction. Among the points defended are that definite descriptions do not have referential meanings, that using a description to refer identifies by implicitly conveying an identity, that one can describe a (singular) proposition without being in a position to grasp it, and that incomplete definite descriptions do not threaten Russell’s theory.|
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