Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):459-468 (1997)
|Abstract||No contemporary philosopher has tried harder to demystify the mind than Fred Dretske. But how to demystify it without eviscerating it? Can consciousness be explained? Many philosophers think that no matter how detailed and systematic our knowledge becomes of how the brain works and how it subserves mental functions, there will always remain an "explanatory gap." Call it a brute fact or call it a mystery, trying to explain consciousness, they think, is as futile as trying to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Dretske is not exercised by the explanatory gap-he'd rather exorcise it. He thinks we can get all the explanation we need by understanding what consciousness does. Consciousness is at bottom sensory experience and what it does, essentially, is to represent the world. Explaining consciousness, therefore, comes down to understanding the representational character of experience|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sofia Miguens (2002). Qualia or Non Epistemic Perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's Representational Theories of Consciousness. Agora 21 (2):193-208.
William E. Seager (1997). Critical Notice of Fred Dretske's Naturalizing the Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):83-109.
Paul Sheldon Davies (1997). Deflating Consciousness: A Critical Review of Fred Dretske's Naturalizing the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):541-550.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Amie Thomasson (2008). Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World. The Monist 91 (2):191-214.
A. Minh Nguyen (2001). A Critique of Dretske's Conception of State Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.
Colin McGinn (1997). Fred Dretske'snaturalizing the Mind(MIT Press, 1995)Missing the Mind: Consciousness in the Swamps. Noûs 31 (4):528–537.
William E. Seager (1994). Dretske on HOT Theories of Consciousness. Analysis 54 (4):270-76.
Robert W. Lurz (2003). Advancing the Debate Between HOT and FO Accounts of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:23-44.
Kent Bach (1997). Engineering the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):459-468.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #44,895 of 739,656 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,423 of 739,656 )
How can I increase my downloads?