Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||If you think that semantic minimalism is the only alternative to contextualism but you’d rather do without Cappelen and Lepore’s mysteriously minimal “propositions,” you can. You just have to recognize that being semantically incomplete does not make a sentence context-sensitive. You don’t have to go through the ritual of repeatedly incanting things like this: “John is ready” expresses the proposition that John is ready. Instead, you can opt for Radical Minimalism and suppose that “John is ready” and its ilk fall short of semantically expressing propositions – their semantic contents are propositional “radicals.” Now C&L think they’ve addressed Radical Minimalism and offered objections to it. So they find it strange and bizarre that I think they haven’t. In fact, they persist in confusing semantic incompleteness with context sensitivity. If they appreciated the difference, they might even welcome the opportunity to adopt a form of semantic minimalism that does without the minimal propositions that everyone but them find incredible (pun intended).|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). A Tall Tale : In Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press.
Steven A. Gross (2006). Can One Sincerely Say What One Doesn't Believe? Mind and Language 21 (1):11-20.
John MacFarlane (2007). Semantic Minimalism and Nonindexical Contextualism. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
Ernie Lepore (2010). Saying and Agreeing. Mind and Language 25 (5):583-601.
Kent Bach (2006). The Excluded Middle: Semantic Minimalism Without Minimal Propositions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):435–442.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads68 ( #15,803 of 739,336 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,187 of 739,336 )
How can I increase my downloads?