Giorgione was so-called because of his name
Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):73-103 (2002)
| Abstract | Proper names seem simple on the surface. Indeed, anyone unfamiliar with philosophical debates about them might wonder what the fuss could possibly be about. It seems obvious why we need them and what we do with them, and that is to talk about particular persons, places, and things. You don't have to be as smart as Mill to think that proper names are simply tags attached to individuals. But sometimes appearances are deceiving. | |||||||||
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David S. Schwarz (1978). Causality, Referring, and Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233.
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Ora Matushansky (2008). On the Linguistic Complexity of Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):573-627.
David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs 39 (4):596–631.
Eric Thomas Weber (2008). Proper Names and Persons: Peirce's Semiotic Consideration of Proper Names. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2):pp. 346-362.
Stefano Predelli (2010). Substitutivity, Obstinacy, and the Case of Giorgione. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1).
Delia Graff Fara (2011). You Can Call Me 'Stupid', ... Just Don't Call Me Stupid. Analysis 71 (3):492-501.
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