Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):73-103 (2002)
|Abstract||Proper names seem simple on the surface. Indeed, anyone unfamiliar with philosophical debates about them might wonder what the fuss could possibly be about. It seems obvious why we need them and what we do with them, and that is to talk about particular persons, places, and things. You don't have to be as smart as Mill to think that proper names are simply tags attached to individuals. But sometimes appearances are deceiving.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
David S. Schwarz (1978). Causality, Referring, and Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233.
Delia Graff Fara (2011). You Can Call Me 'Stupid', ... Just Don't Call Me Stupid. Analysis 71 (3):492-501.
Stefano Predelli (2010). Substitutivity, Obstinacy, and the Case of Giorgione. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):5 - 21.
Eric Thomas Weber (2008). Proper Names and Persons: Peirce's Semiotic Consideration of Proper Names. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2):pp. 346-362.
David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs 39 (4):596–631.
Ora Matushansky (2008). On the Linguistic Complexity of Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):573-627.
Gil Anidjar (2006). Traité de Tous les Noms (What Is Called Naming). Epoché 10 (2):287-301.
Carlo Semenza (2009). The Neuropsychology of Proper Names. Mind and Language 24 (4):347-369.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #31,628 of 722,698 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,779 of 722,698 )
How can I increase my downloads?