Moral Epistemological Coherentism, Contextualism, and Consensualism

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):69-89 (2009)
The discussion regards moral epistemology as the research of a proper methodology in moral thinking. Coherentism is proposed as the appropriate methodology in the individual context of moral thinking (because of the fact that all the alternatives to coherentism, at least understood as a regulatory ideal, are opposed to rationality), while a qualified form of consensualism is proposed as the appropriate methodology in the context of communitarian or public justification of beliefs
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DOI croatjphil2009916
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Friderik Klampfer (2005). Contextualism and Moral Justification. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):569-582.
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