Practical and scientific rationality: A difficulty for Levi's epistemology

Synthese 57 (3):269 - 276 (1983)
Traditionally scientific rationality has been distinguished from mere practical rationality. It has seemed that it is sometimes rational to accept statements for the purposes of particular practical deliberations even though it would not be rational to count them as having been confirmed by science. Isaac Levi contends that this traditional view is mistaken. He thinks that there should be a single standard of acceptance for all purposes, scientific and practical. The author contends that Levi has given no good reason for identifying scientific with practical rationality. And he argues that Levi's own theory is inconsistent with the thesis that a scientist should use a single standard of acceptance in all his scientific deliberations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01064698
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 20,010
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

14 ( #246,664 of 1,793,059 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #169,529 of 1,793,059 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.