Graduate studies at Western
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):105-105 (1997)
|Abstract||Mele views self-deception as belief sustained by motivationally biased treatment of evidence. This view overlooks something essential, for it does not reckon with the fact that in self-deception the truth is dangerously close at hand and must be repeatedly suppressed. Self-deception is not so much a matter of what one positively believes as what one manages not to think.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
John A. Barnden (1997). Deceived by Metaphor. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):105-106.
William N. Whisner (1993). Self-Deception and Other-Person Deception: Toward a New Conceptualization of Self- Deception. Philosophia 22 (3-4):223-240.
Dion Scott-Kakures (2001). High Anxiety: Barnes on What Moves the Unwelcome Believer. Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):313 – 326.
Frederick A. Siegler (1963). Self-Deception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):29-43.
Jose Luis Bermudez (1997). Defending Intentionalist Accounts of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):107-108.
Alfred R. Mele (1999). Twisted Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.
Clancy W. Martin (ed.) (2009). The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press.
Howard Rachlin & Marvin Frankel (1997). The Uses of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):124-125.
Alfred R. Mele (1997). Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
Robert Audi (1997). Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #46,469 of 739,482 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,482 )
How can I increase my downloads?