The logical form of perception sentences

Synthese 41 (2):271 - 308 (1979)
The perceptual logic of j hintikka and r thomason is imbedded in a more general framework of quantification over individual-concepts. two intensional predicates for physical individuation and perceptual individuation are required in place of thomason's two variable-sorts. objectual perception of x by s is then definable as "for some y there is a perceptually individuated object z, in fact identical with x, such that s perceives that y is z."
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References found in this work BETA
John Bacon (1975). Belief as Relative Knowledge. In Alan Ross Anderson, Ruth Barcan Marcus, R. M. Martin & Frederic B. Fitch (eds.), The Logical Enterprise. Yale University Press. 189--210.

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