The myth of conventional implicature

Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):327-366 (1999)
Abstract
Grice’s distinction between what is said and what is implicated has greatly clarified our understanding of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. Although border disputes still arise and there are certain difficulties with the distinction itself (see the end of §1), it is generally understood that what is said falls on the semantic side and what is implicated on the pragmatic side. But this applies only to what is..
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Caj Strandberg (2012). A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
Christopher Hom (2010). Pejoratives. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):164-185.

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