The myth of conventional implicature
Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):327-366 (1999)
| Abstract | Grice’s distinction between what is said and what is implicated has greatly clarified our understanding of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. Although border disputes still arise and there are certain difficulties with the distinction itself (see the end of §1), it is generally understood that what is said falls on the semantic side and what is implicated on the pragmatic side. But this applies only to what is.. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesKent Bach (2005). Tthe Top 10 Minconceptions About Implicature. In Kent Bach (ed.), Festchrift for Larry Horn. John Benjamins.
Napoleon Katsos (2008). The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface From an Experimental Perspective: The Case of Scalar Implicature. Synthese 165 (3):385 - 401.
Jennifer M. Saul (2002). Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and What is Implicated. Noûs 36 (2):228–248.
Stephen Barker (2003). Truth and Conventional Implicature. Mind 112 (445):1-34.
Patrick Hawley (2002). What is Said. Journal of Pragmatics 34 (8):969-991.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads290 ( #486 of 549,070 )Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #3,845 of 549,070 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
