The myth of conventional implicature

Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):327-366 (1999)
Grice’s distinction between what is said and what is implicated has greatly clarified our understanding of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. Although border disputes still arise and there are certain difficulties with the distinction itself (see the end of §1), it is generally understood that what is said falls on the semantic side and what is implicated on the pragmatic side. But this applies only to what is..
Keywords Linguistics   Philosophy of Language   Artificial Intelligence   Computational Linguistics   Semantics   Syntax
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005466020243
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Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558–589.
Elisabeth Camp (2013). Slurring Perspectives. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.

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