The liar paradox and the inclosure schema

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596 (2008)
In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema ). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to 'sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes', because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to 'sink virtually all orthodox solutions', and that the Inclosure Schema cannot be the structure that underlies the Liar paradox. Moreover, Ramsey was right in thinking that logical and semantic paradoxes are paradoxes of different kinds.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Graham Priest (2010). Badici on Inclosures and the Liar Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):359-366.
    Zach Weber (2010). Explanation And Solution In The Inclosure Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):353-357.
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