Evidentialism, vice, and virtue

Evidentialists maintain that epistemic justification is strictly a function of the evidence one has at the moment of belief. I argue here, on the basis of two kinds of cases, that the possession of good evidence is an insuflicient basis for justification. I go on to propose a modification of evidentialism according to which justification sometimes requires intellectually virtuous agency. The discussion thereby underscores an important point of contact between evidentialism and the more recent enterprise of virtue epistemology
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00255.x
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Jan Willem Wieland (2014). Sceptical Rationality. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):222-238.

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