Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567 (2009)
|Abstract||Evidentialists maintain that epistemic justification is strictly a function of the evidence one has at the moment of belief. I argue here, on the basis of two kinds of cases, that the possession of good evidence is an insuflicient basis for justification. I go on to propose a modification of evidentialism according to which justification sometimes requires intellectually virtuous agency. The discussion thereby underscores an important point of contact between evidentialism and the more recent enterprise of virtue epistemology|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Todd Long (2012). Mentalist Evidentialism Vindicated (and a Super-Blooper Epistemic Design Problem for Proper Function Justification). Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.
Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
Allen Wood (2008). The Duty to Believe According to the Evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):7 - 24.
John Zeis (2006). Evidentialism and Faith. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:185-200.
Scott F. Aikin (2006). Modest Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Anthony Robert Booth (2007). The Two Faces of Evidentialism. Erkenntnis 67 (3):401 - 417.
T. Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
Daniel M. Mittag, Evidentialism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-04-28
Total downloads91 ( #9,498 of 739,250 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,250 )
How can I increase my downloads?