Is There a Value Problem?

In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. OUP Oxford (2009)
The value problem in epistemology is rooted in a commonsense intuition to the effect that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Call this the “guiding intuition.” The guiding intuition generates a problem in light of two additional considerations. The first is that knowledge is (roughly) justified or warranted true belief.[1] The second is that on certain popular accounts of justification or warrant (e.g. reliabilism), its value is apparently instrumental to and hence derivative from the value of true belief.[2] But if knowledge is justified true belief and the value of justification is derivative from that of true belief, how is it that knowledge is more valuable than true belief?
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Dennis Whitcomb (2010). Curiosity Was Framed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.
Dennis Whitcomb (2010). Curiosity Was Framed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.
Miranda Fricker (2009). The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:121-138.

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