Value in the guise of regret

Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):169 – 187 (2000)
According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention is that agent-regret is a mode of valuing: a way in which the agent expresses and confers value
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DOI 10.1080/13869790008520988
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