Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (3):287–306 (1998)
|Abstract||According to Donald Davidson, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is the third dogma of empiricism. In this paper I examine the ways in which this claim may be interpreted. I conclude by arguing that there remains an innocent version of the scheme-content distinction which is not motivated by empiricism and does not commit us to the pernicious type of dualism that Davidson rejects|
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