Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
Theory and Decision 71 (2):151-162 (2011)
| Abstract | Many voting rules and, in particular, the plurality rule and Condorcet-consistent voting rules satisfy the simple-majority decisiveness property. The problem implied by such decisiveness, namely, the universal disregard of the preferences of the minority, can be ameliorated by applying unbiased scoring rules such as the classical Borda rule, but such amelioration has a price; it implies erosion in the implementation of the widely accepted majority principle . Furthermore, the problems of majority decisiveness and of the erosion in the majority principle are not necessarily severe when one takes into account the likelihood of their occurrence. This paper focuses on the evaluation of the severity of the two problems, comparing simple-majoritarian voting rules that allow the decisiveness of the smallest majority larger than 1/2 and the classical Borda method of counts. Our analysis culminates in the derivation of the conditions that determine, in terms of the number of alternatives k, the number of voters n, and the relative (subjective) weight assigned to the severity of the two problems, which of these rules is superior in light of the dual majoritarian approach. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDominique Lepelley, Patrick Pierron & Fabrice Valognes (2000). Scoring Rules, Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity. Theory and Decision 49 (2):175-196.
Jacob Paroush (1997). Order Relations Among Efficient Decision Rules. Theory and Decision 43 (3):209-218.
Yann Allard-Tremblay (forthcoming). The Epistemic Edge of Majority Voting Over Lottery Voting. Res Publica.
Christian List (2004). On the Significance of the Absolute Margin. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):521-544.
Michel Regenwetter, James Adams & Bernard Grofman (2002). On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An Alternative View of Majority Cycles and Social Homogeneity. Theory and Decision 53 (2):153-186.
Gilbert Laffond (2000). Majority Voting on Orders. Theory and Decision 49 (3):249-287.
William V. Gehrlein (2002). Condorcet's Paradox and the Likelihood of its Occurrence: Different Perspectives on Balanced Preferences. Theory and Decision 52 (2):171-199.
Anthony de Jasay (1990). A Stocktaking of Perversities. Critical Review 4 (4):537-544.
Uriel Procaccia & Uzi Segal (2003). Super Majoritarianism and the Endowment Effect. Theory and Decision 55 (3):181-207.
Philip Pettit (2006). No Testimonial Route to Consensus. Episteme 3 (3):156-165.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-07-13Total downloads2 ( #232,628 of 549,224 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,224 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
