Abstract Aggregations and Proximity Preservation: An Impossibility Result [Book Review]

Theory and Decision 56 (4):359-366 (2004)
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Abstract

An impossibility result for completely abstract social aggregation rules is presented. It is shown that non-imposition and a new no-veto property (two properties in the spirit of the Pareto principle and non-dictatorship respectively) are incompatible with an inter-profile consistency condition formulated in terms of proximity preservation

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Nick Baigent
London School of Economics

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