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- Cathryn Bailey (2009). A Man and a Dog in a Lifeboat: Self-Sacrifice, Animals, and the Limits of Ethical Theory. Ethics and the Environment 14 (1):pp. 129-148.In discussions of animal ethics, hypothetical scenarios are often used to try to force the clarification of intuitions about the relative value of human and animal life. Tom Regan requests, for example, that we imagine a man and a dog adrift in a lifeboat while Peter Singer explains why the life of one's child ought to be preferred to that of the family dog in the event of a house fire. I argue that such scenarios are not the usefully abstract analytic tools they purport to be, but indirectly reinforce assumptions that are not only anthropocentric, but also tied to racist, sexist and ethnocentric stereotypes. An analysis of some of the cultural and ethical associations of the notion of self-sacrifice proves especially useful in revealing some of the limitations of certain popular Western approaches to animal ethics.
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Machine generated contents note: ContentsIntroduction: A Change of Heart1. What's behind Animal Advocacy? -- 2. The Love of a Dog: Of Pets and Puppy Mills, Mixed-Breeds and Shelters -- 3. The Animal on Your Plate: Farmers, Vegans, and Locavores -- 4. Where the Wild Things Ought to Be: Sanctuaries, Zoos, and Exotic Pets -- 5. From Object to Subject: Animals in Scientific Research -- 6. Clothing Ourselves in Stories of Love: Affect and Animal AdvocacyConclusion: Trouble in the PackAcknowledgments -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
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Tom Regan has powerfully argued that all sentient beings having some awareness of self are equal in inherent value, and that their interests where relevant must be given equal treatment. Yet Regan also contends that there are some situations in which the value of different lives should be compared and choice made between them. He supposes an overloaded lifeboat with five occupants in which all will die unless one is thrown overboard. Four of the occupants are human, one is a dog; and Regan holds that it is the dog that ought to go since its life is of less value than that of a human. Regan has thus been sharply attacked for inconsistency. Some say that the comparison of lives, even in this sort of case, contradicts the principle of equal inherent value and introduces a utilitarian calculation of benefit. Othersobject that no ground of choice exists in situations of this sort. But all these criticisms turn out to be unjustified.
situation is one in which all are in great peril and someone must be sacrificed lest all perish. In such situations, it is permissible to do things which would be considered wrong under less drastic circumstances. Proponents of animal rights such as Tom Regan agree that in such circumstances it may be necessary to sacrifice a dog in order to save human life. Is such an admission consistent with calling for the abolition of all scientific research on animals? That is, is scientific research a ‘lifeboat’? The analogy is tempting but flawed. The demand for abolition of animal research is not marred by consistency on this score. Keywords: abolition, animal research, animal rights, lifeboat cases, Tom Regan CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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