Algebraic substantivalism and the hole argument

Abstract
Algebraic substantivalism, as an interpretation of general relativity formulated in the Einstein algebra formalism, avoids the hole argument against manifold substantivalism. In this essay, I argue that this claim is well-founded. I first identify the hole argument as an argument against a specific form of semantic realism with respect to spacetime. I then consider algebraic substantivalism as an alternative form of semantic realism. In between, I justify this alternative form by reviewing the Einstein algebra formalism and indicating the extent to which it is expressively equivalent to the standard formalism of tensor analysis on differential manifolds.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Only published papers are available at libraries
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Jeremy Butterfield (1988). Albert Einstein Meets David Lewis. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:65 - 81.
    John Norton (1988). The Hole Argument. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:56 - 64.
    John Earman & John Norton (1987). What Price Spacetime Substantivalism? The Hole Story. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):515-525.
    Carolyn Brighouse (1997). Determinism and Modality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):465-481.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    45 ( #31,123 of 1,089,154 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,735 of 1,089,154 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.