Category-Theoretic Structure and Radical Ontic Structural Realism

Synthese 190 (9):1621-1635 (2013)
Abstract
Radical Ontic Structural Realism (ROSR) claims that structure exists independently of objects that may instantiate it. Critics of ROSR contend that this claim is conceptually incoherent, insofar as, (i) it entails there can be relations without relata, and (ii) there is a conceptual dependence between relations and relata. In this essay I suggest that (ii) is motivated by a set-theoretic formulation of structure, and that adopting a category-theoretic formulation may provide ROSR with more support. In particular, I consider how a category-theoretic formulation of structure can be developed that denies (ii), and can be made to do work in the context of formulating theories in physics. Keywords: structural realism, category theory, general relativity..
Keywords Structural realism  Category theory  General relativity
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Mark Ainsworth (2010). What is Ontic Structural Realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 41 (1):50-57.

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Citations of this work BETA
Christian Wüthrich (2012). The Structure of Causal Sets. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (2):223-241.
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