Online research in philosophy

In this book, Julie K. Ward examines Aristotle's thought regarding how language informs our views of what is real. First she places Aristotle's theory in its historical and philosophical contexts in relation to Plato and Speusippus. Ward then explores Aristotle's theory of language as it is deployed in several works, including Ethics, Topics, Physics, and Metaphysics, so as to consider its relation to dialectical practice and scientific explanation as Aristotle conceived it.

Free will sceptics claim that we do not possess free will—or at least, that we do not possess nearly as much free will as we think we do. Some free will sceptics hold that the very notion of free will is incoherent, and that no being could possibly possess free will (Strawson this volume). Others allow that the notion of free will is coherent, but hold that features of our cognitive architecture prevent us from possessing free will. My concern in this chapter is with views of the second kind. According to an increasingly influential line of thought, our common-sense commitment to the existence of free will is threatened in unique ways by what we are learning from the sciences of human agency.

A guardian has a fiduciary relationship to the ward, but what exactly does that mean? Certainly a guardian is expected to act in the best interests of the ward, but how are those interests determined? Guardians are encouraged to act just as the ward would, but that implies that a guardian is closer to being an agent of the ward than a fiduciary. Yet a guardian must reconcile that agent like duty with obligations to the court who appointed him. In light of the perceived value of implementing the wishes of the ward, increasingly, appointing courts have come to treat guardians less as agents of the court and more as agents of the ward.