Intentionalism and pain

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523 (2003)
Abstract
The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in a way that’s available to both opponents and adherents of the view that experiential content is entirely conceptual. In doing so I illuminate peculiarities of somatosensory perception that should interest even those who take a different view of pain experiences.
Keywords Content  Experience  Intentionalism  Metaphysics  Pain  Representation
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    Citations of this work BETA
    David Bain (2007). The Location of Pains. Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.
    Keith Allen (2013). Blur. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.
    Greg Janzen (2013). An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.
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