McDowell and the Presentation of Pains

Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24 (2009)
It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, rationalizing, and classificatory.
Keywords pain  mcdowell  color  perception  response dependence
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DOI 10.5840/philtopics200937113
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