Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Moral Education 9 (2):114-121 (1980)
|Abstract||Abstract and Introduction This paper argues that morality is largely to do with reason and little to do with feelings or affections. In the first section it is argued that there is a necessary connection between the idea of the moral life and the existence of creatures capable of reflection and judgment. The argument is extended in Section Two to include the notions of reason and justification. The nature of justification is examined in Section Three, and these three sections taken together lead up to, and I hope substantiate, the claim that morality is largely and most significantly a rational business. Section Four, more negatively, sketches a characterization of four different ways of talking about feelings or affective states and suggests that they are all inadequate bases of moral judgment. The proper place to look for affective considerations bearing upon moral judgment is indicated briefly in the final section together with a hint of the author's position on moral principles. Nothing is said directly about moral education but it would follow from the arguments of the paper that moral education is best seen as the development of certain kinds of knowledge and reasoning rather than the cultivation of certain kinds of feeling|
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