Morality Reason and Feeling

Journal of Moral Education 9 (2):114-121 (1980)
Abstract
Abstract and Introduction This paper argues that morality is largely to do with reason and little to do with feelings or affections. In the first section it is argued that there is a necessary connection between the idea of the moral life and the existence of creatures capable of reflection and judgment. The argument is extended in Section Two to include the notions of reason and justification. The nature of justification is examined in Section Three, and these three sections taken together lead up to, and I hope substantiate, the claim that morality is largely and most significantly a rational business. Section Four, more negatively, sketches a characterization of four different ways of talking about feelings or affective states and suggests that they are all inadequate bases of moral judgment. The proper place to look for affective considerations bearing upon moral judgment is indicated briefly in the final section together with a hint of the author's position on moral principles. Nothing is said directly about moral education but it would follow from the arguments of the paper that moral education is best seen as the development of certain kinds of knowledge and reasoning rather than the cultivation of certain kinds of feeling
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Citations of this work BETA
    Tom Kitwood (1988). Sentient Being, Moral Agent. Journal of Moral Education 17 (2):83-91.
    Similar books and articles
    Shaun Nichols (2005). Innateness and Moral Psychology. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 353--369.
    Sabine Roeser (2009). Reid and Moral Emotions. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):177-192.
    Qingjie Wang (2010). Virtue Ethics and Being Morally Moved. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (3):309-321.
    G. Abend (2013). What the Science of Morality Doesn't Say About Morality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):157-200.
    Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (2010). Can Morality Be Codified. Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 11 (1&2):145-154.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-09-02

    Total downloads

    4 ( #198,532 of 1,088,384 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,384 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.