|Abstract||The objective theory of probability of Richard von Mises has been criticized by Crovelli (2009), who defends a subjective approach. This paper attempts to clarify the different meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ when applied to probability, and then argues for an objective Bayesian theory of probability, as exemplified in the writings [...]|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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