Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):427 - 434 (2004)
|Abstract||Simon Blackburn objects that Wittgenstein's private language argument overlooks the possibility that a private linguist can equip himself with a criterion of correctness by confirming generalizations about the patterns in which his private sensations occur. Crispin Wright responds that appropriate generalizations would be too few to be interesting. But I show that Wright's calculations are upset by his failure to appreciate both the richness of the data and the range of theories that would be available to the private linguist|
|Keywords||private language argument ludwig wittgenstein crispin wright simon blackburn|
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