Reason and experience

Noûs 7 (1):56-67 (1973)
My two major theses are that (i) prescriptivism obscures certain parallels between practical and theoretical reasoning, Lends plausibility to the false view that practical reasoning is not empirically based, And misunderstands ordinary usage; (ii) the main difference between claims of theoretical and practical reasoning lies in the logical relation between the conclusions of such claims and what they license: beliefs and intuitions, Respectively.
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DOI 10.2307/2216184
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