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- Jane Bailey & Ian Kerr (2007). Seizing Control?: The Experience Capture Experiments of Ringley & Mann. Ethics and Information Technology 9 (2).Will the proliferation of devices that provide the continuous archival and retrieval of personal experiences (CARPE) improve control over, access to and the record of collective knowledge as Vannevar Bush once predicted with his futuristic memex? Or is it possible that their increasing ubiquity might pose fundamental risks to humanity, as Donald Norman contemplated in his investigation of an imaginary CARPE device he called the “Teddy”? Through an examination of the webcam experiment of Jenni Ringley and the EyeTap experiments of Steve Mann, this article explores some of the social implications of CARPE. The authors’ central claim is that focussing on notions of individual consent and control in assessing the privacy implications of CARPE while reflective of the individualistic conception of privacy that predominates western thinking, is nevertheless inadequate in terms of recognizing the effect of individual uptake of these kinds of technologies on the level of privacy we are all collectively entitled to expect. The authors urge that future analysis ought to take a broader approach that considers contextual factors affecting user groups and the possible limitations on our collective ability to control the social meanings associated with the subsequent distribution and use of personal images and experiences after they are captured and archived. The authors ultimately recommend an approach that takes into account the collective impact that CARPE technologies will have on privacy and identity formation and highlight aspects of that approach.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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The standard response to engineering disasters like the Deepwater Horizon case is to ascribe full moral responsibility to individuals and to collectives treated as individuals. However, this approach is inappropriate since concrete action and experience in engineering contexts seldom meets the criteria of our traditional moral theories. Technological action is often distributed rather than individual or collective, we lack full control of the technology and its consequences, and we lack knowledge and are uncertain about these consequences. In this paper, I analyse these problems by employing Kierkegaardian notions of tragedy and moral responsibility in order to account for experiences of the tragic in technological action. I argue that ascription of responsibility in engineering contexts should be sensitive to personal experiences of lack of control, uncertainty, role conflicts, social dependence, and tragic choice. I conclude that this does not justify evading individual and corporate responsibility, but inspires practices of responsibility ascription that are less ‘harsh’ on those directly involved in technological action, that listen to their personal experiences, and that encourage them to gain more knowledge about what they are doing.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org springerlink.com | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The success of the health care system depends on the accuracy, correctness and trustworthiness of the information, and the privacy rights of individuals to control the disclosure of personal information. A national policy on health informational privacy should be guided by ethical principles that respect individual autonomy while recognizing the important collective interests in the use of health information. At present there are no adequate laws or constitutional principles to help guide a rational privacy policy. The laws are scattered and fragmented across the states. Constitutional law is highly general, without important specific safeguards. Finally, a case study is provided showing the important trade-offs that exist between public health and privacy. For a model public health law, see www.critpath.org/msphpa/privacy.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This essay critically examines some classic philosophical and legal theories of privacy, organized into four categories: the nonintrusion, seclusion, limitation, and control theories of privacy. Although each theory includes one or more important insights regarding the concept of privacy, I argue that each falls short of providing an adequate account of privacy. I then examine and defend a theory of privacy that incorporates elements of the classic theories into one unified theory: the Restricted Access/Limited Control (RALC) theory of privacy. Using an example involving data-mining technology on the Internet, I show how RALC can help us to frame an online privacy policy that is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to address a wide range of privacy concerns that arise in connection with computers and information technology.
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| | Other links: interscience.wiley.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the importance of liberal engagement in public debate, in the face of Nagel’s claim that respect for privacy requires liberals to withdraw from their ‘control of the culture’. The paper starts by outlining a pluralist conception of privacy. I then proceed to examine whether there really is liberal cultural control, as Nagel affirms it, and whether such control truly involves a violation of privacy. Moreover, I argue that Nagel’s desire to leave the social and cultural space radically neutral is incompatible with Rawls’ conception of public reason and clashes with the need to justify liberal institutions.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Despite their differences, the three most prominent accounts of informational privacy on the contemporary scene—the Control Theory, the Limited Access Theory, and the Narrow Ignorance Theory—all hold that an individual’s informational privacy is at least partly a function of a kind of inability of others to know personal facts about her. This common commitment, I argue, renders the accounts vulnerable to compelling counterexamples. I articulate a new account of informational privacy—the Broad Ignorance Theory—that avoids the commitment by rendering an individual’s informational privacy exclusively a function of others’ ignorance ofpersonal facts about her. I then go on to answer four objections to the Broad Ignorance Theory: that it paradoxically renders private what is in the public domain, that it fails to explain the oddity of attributions of informational privacy to individuals unable to control whether others know various personal facts about them, that it conflates informational privacy and secrecy, and that it conflicts with intuitions about informational privacy losses stemming from false or unjustified beliefs. In the final section of the paper I consider the plausibility of expanding the Broad Ignorance Theory into an account of privacy in general.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Abstract. This paper both clarifies and broadens the notion of control and its relation to the self. By discussing instances of skillful absorption from different cultural backgrounds, I argue that the notion of control is not as closely related to self-consciousness as is often suggested. Experiences of flow and wu-wei exemplify a nonself-conscious though personal type of control. The intercultural occurrence of this type of behavioral control demonstrates its robustness, and questions two long-held intuitions about the relation between self-consciousness and the experience of control. The first intuition holds that the conscious self initiates and controls actions, thoughts, and feelings. The second is the view that losing this self-conscious type of control is a negative and upsetting experience. By focusing on “the paradox of control” in these experiences of skillful absorption, I argue that a feeling of control can occur without a self that narratively claims control. Furthermore, this type of control can be a very positive and pleasurable experience. Therefore, the common views of the notion of control are in need of broader conceptualization and further refinement.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Most of the debate about online social networking sites, such as Facebook, has thus far revolved around questions of privacy and access to personal information. Users of such services, should they choose to exercise them, have a myriad of privacy options that allow them to restrict access to their own personal information posted online, and the privacy policies of such sites are abundantly clear that the making of such choices is the responsibility of the Users themselves. However, due to the focus resting upon these peer-to-peer privacy questions, those relating to the service provider-to-User relationship have been overlooked. This paper seeks to highlight some of the more subtle privacy issues of (what we will call) the ‘Facebook debate’ in terms of two main considerations: the access to and the control of personal information posted online.
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| | Other links: wolfpublishers.com | Scholar | More options ... Ubiquitous computing technologies will have a wide impact on our daily lives in the future. Currently, most debates about social implications of these technologies concentrate on different aspects of privacy and data security. However, the authors of this paper argue that there is more to consider from a social perspective: In particular, the question is raised how people can maintain control in environments that are supposed to be totally automated. Hinting at the possibility that people may be subdued to machinesâ autonomous actions we introduce the term Technology Paternalism . We elaborate a working definition and illustrate the concept by looking at different examples based on current and future technology. We also dwell on the impacts of ubiquity and control of technology and suggest some approaches to assure a reasonable balance of interests such as a general right for the last word.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... To be human is to be engaged in relationships of friendship, trust, and love. These relationships cannot flourish unless information essential to each relationship is kept within the confines of that relationship--unless the individuals involved have knowledge of, and control over, the information about themselves that is available within their particular relationships. This knowledge of and control over information about oneself is the core of "privacy"; privacy's role in maintaining relationships explains its importance to us. Technological advances in computing have made it possible to glean bits of information about an individual from a variety of relationships--personal, professional, medical, financial--and to combine them into a "virtual mosaic" of that individual. In plucking information about an individual from various discrete relationships, and making it available in yet other relationships, this activity violates that individual's right to privacy.
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| | Other links: informaworld.com | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Defining privacy is problematic because the condition of privacy appears simultaneously to require separation from others, and the possibility of choosing not to be separate. This latter feature expresses the inherent normative dimension of privacy: the capacity to control the perceptual and informational spaces surrounding one’s person. Clearly the features of separation and control as just described are in tension because one may easily enough choose to give up all barriers between oneself and the public space. How could the capacity for privacy give rise to its absence? Yet both the separation and control features of privacy do seem indispensable to any sensible understanding of it. In this paper I set out an approach to defining privacy that keeps these features and avoids the tension between them.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Jane Bailey & Ian Kerr, Seizing control?: The experience capture experiments of ringley & Mann
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