The unsoundness of arguments from conceivability

It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability arguments are less well agreed upon, and it remains unclear how to distinguish between sound and unsound instances of the form. In this paper I provide an analysis of the form of arguments from conceivability, and use this analysis to diagnose a systematic weakness in the argument form which reveals all its instances to be, roughly, either uninformative or unsound. I illustrate this conclusion through a consideration of David Chalmers
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Andrew Botterell (2001). Conceiving What is Not There. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.
Katalin Balog (1998). Conceivability Arguments. Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick

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