What makes pains unpleasant?

Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89 (2013)
Abstract
The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of possessing content that is indeed indicative, but also, crucially, evaluative
Keywords Philosophy of mind  Pain  Hedonic tone  Affect  Valence  Unpleasantness  Painfulness  Reasons
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David Bain (2011). The Imperative View of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.

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