Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind

Cambridge University Press (1995)
Abstract
Explaining Attitudes offers a timely and important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of immaterial souls is a 'non-starter'. Practical realism takes beliefs to be states of the whole persons, rather like states of health. What a person believes is determined by what a person would do, say and think in various circumstances. Thus beliefs and other attitudes are interwoven into an integrated, commonsensical conception of reality.
Keywords Philosophy of mind  Attitude (Psychology
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Call number BD418.3.B35 1995
ISBN(s) 9780521421904   0521420539   052142190X
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Citations of this work BETA
Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):59-71.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Reply to Jackson, II. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):196-198.
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