Graduate studies at Western
Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16 (2011)
|Abstract||Abstract: On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation of action. This article aims to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents—at least rational agents and moral agents—have robust first-person perspectives. The author concludes with a view of intentional causation, according to which reasons are constituted by (but not identical to) neural phenomena. The idea of constitution without identity allows for a causal account of action that automatically includes first-personal aspects of agency|
|Keywords||first‐person concept rational agency neural phenomena practical reasoning human action causation agency first‐personal aspects of agency moral agency persons first‐person perspective constitution view Davidson action nonhuman action intentional explanation|
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