Just What Do We Have In Mind?

In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, X (1986). University of Minnesota Press. 25-48 (1986)
Abstract
M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
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