Just What Do We Have In Mind?

In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press 25-48 (1986)
M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00533.x
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