Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist?
Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504 (1995)
| Abstract | Although prominent Christian theologians and philosophers have assumed the truth of mind/ixrdy dualism, I want to raise the question of whether the Christian ought to be a mind/body dualist. First, I sketch a picture of mind, and of human persons, that is not a form of mind/body dualism. Then, I argue that the nondualistic picture is compatible with a major traditional Christian doctrine, the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Finally, I suggest that if a Christian»eed»ot be a mind/body dualist, then she shou(d »ot be a mind/body dualist | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesLynne Rudder Baker (1995). Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist' ? Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist? - No. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Dean W. Zimmerman (2004). Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist?: Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). Reply to Zimmerman's 'Should a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist?' - Yes. In Michael L. Peterson & Raymond Vanarragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). A Quasi-Materialist, Quasi-Dualist Solution to the Mind-Body Problem. Kriterion 45 (109):81-135.
J. P. Moreland (2001). Topic Neutrality and the Parity Thesis: A Surrejoinder to Williams. Religious Studies 37 (1):93-101.
John A. Foster (1993). Dennett's Rejection of Dualism. Inquiry 36 (1-2):17-31.
Stephen Burwood (2008). The Apparent Truth of Dualism and the Uncanny Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2).
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