Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection

Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348 (2007)
Abstract
Theories of the human person differ greatly in their ability to underwrite a metaphysics of resurrection. This paper compares and contrasts a number of such views in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection. In a Christian framework, resurrection requires that the same person who exists on earth also exists in an afterlife, that a postmortem person be embodied, and that the existence of a postmortem person is brought about by a miracle. According to my view of persons (the Constitution View), a human person is constituted by—but not identical to—a human organism. A person has a first-person perspective essentially, and an organism has interrelated biological functions essentially. I shall argue for the superiority the Constitution View as a metaphysical basis for resurrection
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Lynne Baker (2011). Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
    Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen (2010). Surviving Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123 - 139.
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    Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen (2010). Surviving Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123-139.
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