David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348 (2007)
Theories of the human person differ greatly in their ability to underwrite a metaphysics of resurrection. This paper compares and contrasts a number of such views in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection. In a Christian framework, resurrection requires that the same person who exists on earth also exists in an afterlife, that a postmortem person be embodied, and that the existence of a postmortem person is brought about by a miracle. According to my view of persons (the Constitution View), a human person is constituted by—but not identical to—a human organism. A person has a first-person perspective essentially, and an organism has interrelated biological functions essentially. I shall argue for the superiority the Constitution View as a metaphysical basis for resurrection
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (2011). First-Personal Aspects of Agency. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
Lynne Baker (2011). Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
Jonathan Loose (2013). The Metaphysics of Constitution and Accounts of the Resurrection. Philosophy Compass 8 (9):857-865.
Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen (2010). Surviving Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123 - 139.
Similar books and articles
William R. Carter (2002). Many Minds, No Persons. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):55-70.
Michael Potts (1998). Aquinas, Hell, and the Resurrection of the Damned. Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):341-351.
Kevin J. Corcoran (1998). Persons and Bodies. Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):324-340.
Hud Hudson (2001). A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. Cornell University Press.
William Hasker (2004). The Constitution View of Persons. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2005). When Does a Person Begin? Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
William Hasker (2004). The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.
Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen (2010). Surviving Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123-139.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection. Faith and Philosophy 18 (2):151-167.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads128 ( #9,196 of 1,410,448 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #32,644 of 1,410,448 )
How can I increase my downloads?