Philosophy of Science 74 (5):692-700 (2007)
|Abstract||In their paper, “Vexing Expectations,” Nover and Hájek (2004) present an allegedly paradoxical betting scenario which they call the Pasadena Game (PG). They argue that the silence of standard decision theory concerning the value of playing PG poses a serious problem. This paper provides a threefold response. First, I argue that the real problem is not that decision theory is “silent” concerning PG, but that it delivers multiple conflicting verdicts. Second, I offer a diagnosis of the problem based on the insight that standard decision theory is, rightly, sensitive to order. Third, I describe a new betting scenario—the Alternating St. Petersburg Game—which is genuinely paradoxical. Standard decision theory is silent on the value of playing this game even if restrictions are placed on the order in which the various alternative payoffs are summed. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081; e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Frank Arntzenius (2008). No Regrets, Or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 68 (2):277-297.
Kenny Easwaran (2008). Strong and Weak Expectations. Mind 117 (467):633-641.
J. Sprenger & R. Heesen (2011). The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations. Mind 120 (479):819-832.
J. McKenzie Alexander (2011). Expectations and Choiceworthiness. Mind 120 (479):803-817.
Mark Colyvan (2006). No Expectations. Mind 115 (459):695-702.
Harris Nover & Alan Hájek (2008). Complex Expectations. Mind 117 (467):643 - 664.
Alan Hájek & Harris Nover (2008). Complex Expectations. Mind 117 (467):643 - 664.
Mark Colyvan (2008). Relative Expectation Theory. Journal of Philosophy 105 (1):37-44.
Harris Nover & Alan Hájek (2004). Vexing Expectations. Mind 113 (450):237-249.
Alan Hájek & Harris Nover (2006). Perplexing Expectations. Mind 115 (459):703 - 720.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #95,504 of 722,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?