Propositional learning is a useful research heuristic but it is not a theoretical algorithm

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):199-200 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Mitchell et al.'s claim, that their propositional theory is a single-process theory, is illusory because they relegate some learning to a secondary memory process. This renders the single-process theory untestable. The propositional account is not a process theory of learning, but rather, a heuristic that has led to interesting research

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-04-24

Downloads
49 (#286,250)

6 months
1 (#1,028,709)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anna Baker
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity.Warren S. McCulloch & Walter Pitts - 1943 - The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5 (4):115-133.
Cognitive maps in rats and men.Edward C. Tolman - 1948 - Psychological Review 55 (4):189-208.
On the generality of the laws of learning.Martin E. Seligman - 1970 - Psychological Review 77 (5):406-418.
From covariation to causation: A causal power theory.Patricia W. Cheng - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):367-405.

Add more references