Acquaintance and the mind-body problem
In Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.), The Mental, the Physical. Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)
| Abstract | In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides support for physicalism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Acquaintance Phenomenal concepts quotation Mind-Body Problem | |||||||||
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