Acquaintance and the mind-body problem

In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press 16 (2012)
In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides support for physicalism.
Keywords Acquaintance  Phenomenal concepts  Quotation  Mind-Body Problem  Physicalism  Dualism  Explanatory Gap  Hard Problem of Consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Katalin Balog, Acquaintance and the mind-body problem
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Matt Duncan (2015). We Are Acquainted with Ourselves. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2531-2549.
Sam Coleman (2015). Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

349 ( #2,421 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

32 ( #32,356 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.