Against (maddian) naturalized platonism

Philosophia Mathematica 2 (2):97-108 (1994)
Abstract
It is argued here that mathematical objects cannot be simultaneously abstract and perceptible. Thus, naturalized versions of mathematical platonism, such as the one advocated by Penelope Maddy, are unintelligble. Thus, platonists cannot respond to Benacerrafian epistemological arguments against their view vias Maddy-style naturalization. Finally, it is also argued that naturalized platonists cannot respond to this situation by abandoning abstractness (that is, platonism); they must abandon perceptibility (that is, naturalism)
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/2.2.97
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Catherine Legg & James Franklin (2015). Perceiving Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.

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