|Abstract||Abstract Stewart Cohen’s (1984) New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman (1988) and Ernest Sosa (1993; 2001), involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña (2002b; 2010) has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal, suffers serious difficulties from the perspective of the philosophy of language. More specifically, we show that the two readings of sentences involving the word ‘justified’ which are required for Comesaña’s solution to the problem are not recoverable within the two-dimensional framework of Robert Stalnaker (1999) to which he appeals. We then consider, and reject, an attempt to overcome this difficulty by appeal to a complication of the theory involving counterfactuals, and conclude the paper by sketching our own preferred solution to Cohen’s New Evil Demon|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Juan Comesaña (2002). The Diagonal and the Demon. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
Jack Lyons (2013). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
James Chase (2004). Indicator Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115–137.
James Chase (2004). Indicator Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115 - 137.
S. Goldberg (2012). A Novel (and Surprising) Argument Against Justification Internalism. Analysis 72 (2):239-243.
Jonathan Way (2012). Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason. Ethics 122 (3):489-515.
Andrew Moon (2012). Three Forms of Internalism and the New Evil Demon Problem. Episteme 9 (4):345-360.
Adam Leite (2013). But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True! Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):81-104.
Juan Comesaña (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27 - 47.
Juan Comesaña (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
Juan Comesaña (2009). What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Goldman on Evidence and Reliability. In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.
Added to index2012-01-24
Total downloads51 ( #20,569 of 549,196 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,418 of 549,196 )
How can I increase my downloads?