David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 77 (3):353 - 373 (1988)
In this paper I examine Kant''s use of causal language to characterize things in themselves. Following Nicholas Rescher, I contend that Kant''s use of such causal language can only be understood by first coming to grips with the relation of things in themselves to appearances. Unlike Rescher, however, I argue that things in themselves and appearances are not numerically distinct entities. Rather, I claim that it is things in themselves that we are intentionally related to in veridical experience, though of course we know them only as they appear to us via our subjective experiential faculties. In light of this account of the role of things in themselves in Kant''s account of experience, I argue that his use of causal locutions to describe things in themselves is simply his attempt to capture the fact that as the objects that we are related to in experience, the existence of things in themselves is presupposed by any account of the nature of our experienceof them.
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References found in this work BETA
Henry E. Allison (1968). Kant's Concept of the Transcendental Object. Kant-Studien 59 (1-4):165-186.
Henry E. Allison (1976). Kant's Refutation of Realism. Dialectica 30 (2‐3):223-253.
Richard E. Aquila (1981). Intentional Objects and Kantian Appearances. Philosophical Topics 12 (2):9-37.
Richard E. Aquila (1979). Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality and Reality in Kant. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (3):293-308.
Ermanno Bencivenga (1984). Identity, Appearances, and Things in Themselves. Dialogue 23 (03):421-437.
Citations of this work BETA
Kent Baldner (1990). Is Transcendental Idealism Coherent? Synthese 85 (1):1 - 23.
Lucy Allais (2011). Idealism Enough: Response to Roche. Kantian Review 16 (3):375-398.
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