Comments on Ned Block's target article “Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience”
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500 (2007)
|Abstract||Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block’s argument.|
|Keywords||Phenomenality Accessibility Awareness Consciousness|
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