Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem
Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528 (1999)
| Abstract | This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I attempt to show (I think successfully) that this argument is refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is invalid. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Conceivability Metaphysics Mind-body Possibility Chalmers, D Jackson, F | |||||||||
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Sara Worley (2003). Conceivability, Possibility and Physicalism. Analysis 63 (1):15-23.
E. Diaz-Leon (2010). Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap? Mind 119 (476):933-951.
E. Diaz-Leon (2010). Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap? Mind 119 (476):933-951.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities. Synthese 151 (2):273-295.
Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism. Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
Christopher S. Hill (1997). Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.
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