Indexical propositions and de re belief ascriptions

Synthese 146 (3):325 - 355 (2005)
Abstract
  I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism
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Citations of this work BETA
David Pitt (2009). Intentional Psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117 - 138.
Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
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